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ABSTRACT
I examine the consequences of SEC disclosure regulation in the U.S. market for
foreign bonds, where firms can choose to register their issues with the SEC, known
as “Yankee” bonds, or avoid registration using SEC Rule 144A. I use a recent rule
change that allows firms to use IFRS financial statements without reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP as an exogenous reduction in the disclosure costs of registration, and
find that foreign firms are more likely to register their bond issues with the SEC
after the change. More importantly, I find that investors react more negatively to
Rule 144A placements following the rule change, as evidenced by higher cost of
debt and lower credit ratings. The results reconcile to theoretical predictions from
the Unraveling Hypothesis about how both firms and investors react to a decrease
in disclosure costs. The study contributes to our understanding of how disclosure
regulation affects foreign firm financing decisions in the United States, in particular
the decision to register with the SEC.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How disclosure regulation affects both firm and investor behavior is an important
and ongoing question in accounting research (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Disclosure
regulation can improve the information provided to investors, but at a cost to the
transmitting firm. Alternatively, firms can avoid disclosure regulation and issue in the
private market, but suffer an informational disadvantage. An underexplored question
in the accounting literature is how changes in disclosure regulation affect both the
firms choice to participate in public versus private markets, and the associated capital
market consequences.
This paper investigates how disclosure regulation affects foreign firms choice to
register with the SEC when they issue a bond in the United States. Specifically,
I exploit a recent rule change that allows foreign firms to register with the SEC
without reconciling their financial statements to U.S. GAAP if they report using
IFRS as a plausibly exogenous reduction in the disclosure costs of accessing the U.S.
public debt markets. The requirement to reconcile to U.S. GAAP requires lengthy
footnotes that accompany a firm’s home country financial statements. Foreign firms
could avoid these disclosures by issuing their bond in the U.S. private market, which is
exempt from SEC registration or reporting requirements. On November 15, 2007, the
SEC removed the reconciliation requirement for firms using IFRS, which significantly
reduced the number of disclosures required to register a bond issue, at least for a
subset of foreign firms.
The U.S. market for foreign bonds is an advantageous setting within which to
study the consequences of disclosure regulation for several reasons. First, not all
foreign bonds issued in the U.S. are registered with the SEC, as registration is a
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choice of the issuing firm. Registered foreign bonds, which are known as “Yankee”
bonds, are allowed to trade on a public exchange, while unregistered bonds, which
are allowed under SEC Rule 144A, trade only amongst Qualified Institutional Buyers
(QIB). Thus, disclosure regulation could affect a firm’s choice to register the bond,
and consequently which market the bond trades in. Second, bond issues represent
a clear attempt at raising capital, unlike cross-listed equity, which can be motivated
by reasons other than obtaining financing (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). Thus, the
capital market consequences of disclosure regulation might be more apparent within
the bond market than in the equity markets. Third, the cost of debt capital is
more clearly observed compared to equity issues, where the cost of equity capital
must be estimated. Finally, studying foreign issues in the U.S. provides a single
homogeneous market within which to study the consequences of accounting rule
changes in other countries.1 Taken together, this market represents an interesting
and economically important setting within which to examine the capital market
consequences of disclosure regulation.
There are many reasons why foreign firms should want to register their bonds
with the SEC. Registration is associated with better investor protections (Reese and
Weisbach, 2002), lower cost of capital (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004; Hail and
Leuz, 2009), and greater firm value (Doidge et al., 2004). But SEC registration is
costly. Foreign firms cite the increased burden of additional disclosure as one of the
most significant costs of registration (Licht, 2003; Latham & Watkins LLP, 2013).
As a result, a large percentage of foreign firms avoid these disclosure requirements
by issuing into the Rule 144A market.
1This last advantage contrasts with the majority of studies that examine the capital market con-
sequences of accounting standard changes in home-country markets, which are often confounded by
corresponding changes in country-level enforcement mechanisms (Hail and Leuz, 2007; Christensen
et al., 2013; Barth and Israeli, 2013).
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The claim that firms will use Rule 144A to avoid disclosures is interesting, because
investors could interpret this decision as an attempt to hide bad news. To explain
this, I borrow arguments from the voluntary disclosure literature, which predict that
investors react negatively to withheld disclose, and that this negative reaction in
turn motivates firms to disclose more (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981;
Milgrom, 1981). On the other hand, when disclosures are costly, investors under-
stand that some firms withhold disclosures, not because they are hiding bad news,
but because they want to avoid the disclosure costs (Verrecchia, 1983). Therefore,
investors will understand that some firms with good news will use Rule 144A only
to avoid the disclosure costs of SEC registration. If removing the requirement to
reconcile to U.S. GAAP reduced the disclosure costs of SEC registration, then more
firms should register with the SEC, and investors will react more negatively to Rule
144A placements.
The theoretical argument predicts more than just a separation in the market.
The theory predicts the counterfactual outcome had firms issued into the Rule 144A
market: investors would infer with greater likelihood that the issuing firm is hiding
bad news, and so punish them accordingly. This (unobserved) counterfactual out-
come can be thought of as predicting investors reactions off the equilibrium path
that support the realized separation in the market.2
Two significant issues face empirical estimation of the predicted consequences
of the rule change. The first is that firm-level information is not available for the
vast majority of the foreign bonds issued into the United States. For example, not
all foreign firms in my sample publicly disclose their financial information even in
their home country. I am especially averse to dropping observations with missing
2The Game Theory literature often uses the notion of player’s reaction “off the equilibrium
path”, which is used to support a separating equilibrium.
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data, since the crux of the paper is to study the consequences of withheld disclo-
sure. Rather than drop observations due to missing firm level data, I instead exploit
plausibly exogenous variation in the issuing firms home countrys financial reporting
requirements. Using country level variation in reporting requirements avoids the
interpretation of missing firm-level data as a potential confound.
The second issue arises when estimating the (unobserved) counterfactual outcome
had foreign firms issued their bonds into the Rule 144A market following the rule
change in that firms endogenously select which market to issue into. Ideally, we
would like to observe the same bond issued simultaneously issued into both the Rule
144A and Yankee bond markets, both before and after the reporting rule change,
and compare the outcomes. Instead, the research design must carefully consider the
endogeneity issue that arises when the market choice is also affected by the rule
change.
To examine how firms reacted to the SEC rule change, I use country-level adop-
tion of mandatory IFRS and the recent SEC rule change as sources of exogenous
variation in disclosure and reporting requirements. Using a difference-in-difference-
in-differences (DDD) design, I find that firms from countries with mandatory IFRS
reporting are significantly more likely to register their bond following the SEC rule
change. Cross sectional results suggest that the rule change increased the probabil-
ity of registration most significantly amongst those bonds issued from countries with
already strong legal and enforcement mechanisms.
To test investors’ predicted reaction to the withholding of disclosure following a
decrease in disclosure costs, I examine the cost of debt and credit ratings available
in both markets following the rule change. I use a switching model in to address
the problem that arises when firms endogenously choose which market to issue into.
I find that the SEC rule change increased the cost of capital and decreased credit
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ratings available in the Rule 144A market, but did not affect either outcome available
in the Yankee bond market.3 The latter finding of no effect in the public market is
consistent with existing studies that examine cross-listed equities (Kim et al., 2012),
and suggests that removing the requirement to report or reconcile to U.S. GAAP
did not detrimentally affect registered firms. The former finding of an effect on
unregistered bonds is unique to this paper, and demonstrates how regulation that
reduces the cost of disclosure in the public markets can ‘unravel’ the market for
unregistered securities.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, this paper con-
tributes to our understanding of the U.S. market for foreign bonds, which – due to
it’s unique institutional and reporting requirements – is an understudied topic within
the accounting literature. Only a handful of papers study this market. Miller and
Puthenpurackal (2002) investigate 128 bond issues from 14 countries and the choice
between issuing as public debt in the U.S. market versus issuing in the Euodollar
market, but otherwise do not consider unregistered bonds issued under Rule 144A.
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) find that foreign firms issue investment grade
bonds into both the public debt as well as the Rule 144A market, but do not inves-
tigate determinants of which market firms choose. Gao (2011) investigates a sample
of bonds issued between 1990 and 2006, and finds that foreign firms are are signif-
icantly less likely to issue a Yankee bond, when compared to issuing a Rule 144A
or Eurodollar bond, following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Collectively,
research on the unique features of this market remain sparse.
Second, this research contributes to the ongoing debate surrounding the SEC’s
3An endogenous switching model estimates a system of equations on two or more subsamples,
where the endogeneity issue arises based on which subsample the individual self-selects themselves
into. See Kwan and Carleton (2010) for an example applied to the choice between public versus
private debt.
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decision to allow foreign firms the option to report using IFRS without reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP. This rule change represents one of the most significant accounting
policy changes in the United States’ recent history, but it did not occur without
significant controversy. Advocates in favor of the rule change argued that both IFRS
and U.S. GAAP provide high quality disclosure, that firms should be allowed to
choose which standard to follow, and that the requirement to report or reconcile to
U.S. GAAP imposed prohibitive disclosure costs on foreign firms (Jamal et al., 2008).
Advocates against the rule change cautioned that it is not the quality of IFRS, but
the comparability that should be considered, and that material differences between
U.S. GAAP and IFRS continue to exist (Hopkins et al., 2008). Despite the debate,
the empirical literature so far focuses only on cross-listed equities, and suggests that
the rule change passed with very little capital market consequence. For example, Kim
et al. (2012) investigate a sample of 78 firms with cross-listed equity both before and
after the rule change, and find no effect on the probability of informed trading (PIN),
cost of equity, analyst forecasts, institutional ownership, stock price efficiency, or
voluntary disclosure amongst those foreign firms reporting under IFRS. Consistent
with this, Jiang et al. (2010) find no evidence that eliminating the reconciliation
requirement changed the market’s response to the announcement of 20-Fs by IFRS
filers. Thus, if this accounting rule change conveyed any capital market consequence,
it has yet to be observed in the academic literature. My study differs not only by it’s
emphasis on debt, but by focusing on the initial decision to register with the SEC or
not, as well as the capital market consequences amongst unregistered issues.
Finally, this paper contributes to the ongoing investigation into the capital market
consequences of global trend towards acceptance of IFRS. In principle, harmonization
can be achieved by either commonality or reciprocity (Coffee Jr, 1998, p.667). Com-
monality occurs when all firms are subject to a similar set of disclosure requirements,
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which is represented by the global convergence to IFRS. Reciprocity occurs when one
country allows the rules from another country, and is represented by the SEC’s de-
cision to allow IFRS filings. Whether or not convergence of either type has capital
market consequences is still an ongoing debate in the accounting literature (Daske
et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2013; Barth and Israeli, 2013). The findings of this
paper suggest that reciprocity leads to more firms voluntarily subjecting themselves
to U.S. disclosure regulation, and participating in the U.S. public markets.
My paper is related but distinct from at least two other current working papers.
Chen et al. (2013) use bond trading yields to investigate changes in the cost of
debt amongst a sample of foreign firms registered with the SEC following the 2007
rule change. They find no change in trading yields. By construction, the Chen et al.
(2013) sample includes only SEC registered firms, and does not consider unregistered
debt issues into the Rule 144A market. Florou and Kosi (2013) investigate the
probability of issuing public bonds versus private bank loans amongst a sample of
international firms following mandatory adoption of IFRS. They find that firms are
more likely to issue public debt following mandatory IFRS adoption, but otherwise
do not consider the U.S. capital markets or changes in U.S. disclosure regulation.
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED PAPERS
2.1 SEC Registration Requirements for Foreign Firms
The Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 generally require every cor-
poration in the world to register with the SEC whenever securities are transacted in
the United States unless a specific exception exists. SEC registration requires filing
a registration statement, which initially includes a prospectus, financial information,
and other required disclosures. Only after the SEC reviews and approves the sub-
mission does the registration become effective, which allows the securities to transact
publicly.1
Even amongst SEC registered corporations, the securities laws distinguish be-
tween domestic firms and Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs), where FPIs are granted a
number of accommodations when reporting to the SEC.2 For example, FPIs are not
required to provide quarterly or current reports, are exempt from proxy rules gov-
erning the procedures for soliciting shareholder votes, are exempt from Regulation
FD governing non-public disclosures, and are exempt from some beneficial ownership
reporting. The SEC allows FPIs to report using Form 20-F, which contains substan-
tially similar disclosures as the Form 10-K used by domestic firms, but with special
instructions for foreign reporting.
One of the most controversial accommodations granted to Foreign Private Issuers
is the choice to report their financial statements using IFRS or local GAAP. Before
2008, registered FPIs using IFRS or local GAAP were also required to reconcile
1Beginning in 2005, the registration statements of certain Well-Known Seasoned Issuers become
effective upon filing, and the SEC does not have the opportunity to review and approve these
statements before securities are sold.
2The word “private” is used only to distinguish these corporations from government or municipal
entities, and is not meant to imply that these firms are excluded from the public markets.
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their financial statements to U.S. GAAP; but this requirement changed in 2008 to
allow IFRS financial statements without reconciliation. The rule change significantly
reduced the cost of complying with the SEC’s financial reporting requirements, at
least for those firms using IFRS. A reconciliation requires disclosure in addition to nu-
merical quantification of material differences between the two reporting standards.3
The more common reconciling items include disclosures on stock-based compensa-
tion, deferred taxes, post-retirement benefit plans, derivatives, and other financial
investments. Significant reconciling items are also included in the Management’s
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), and some firms list the reconciliation as one of
the firm’s significant risk factors.
A Foreign Private Issuer can avoid the requirement to register with the SEC
– and consequently avoid any reconciliation to U.S. GAAP – if the issuing firm
relies on a specific exemption from registration. For example, private placements are
generally exempt from registration when the issuing corporation does not use broad
solicitation or advertising in the United States to market the securities. Primary
issues to the firm’s underwriters are also covered by this exemption. If securities are
issued without SEC registration, then the investor receives a “restricted security”,
which may prevent subsequent trading of the security on the secondary market.
Because U.S. securities laws apply on a transaction by transaction basis, restricted
securities can only trade on a secondary market if the securities are eventually reg-
istered, or if the holder of the restricted securities relies on a continued exemption
from registration. One such exemption is Rule 144A, which was adopted by the SEC
in April 1990 in order to encourage a more liquid secondary market for unregistered
3Item 18 of the Form 20-F instructions specifically require Foreign Private Issuers to provide “all
information required by U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and Regulation S-X unless
such requirements specifically do not apply to the registrant as a foreign issuer.” Regulation S-X
governs the required information in both the financial statements and accompanying notes.
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securities. Rule 144A allows the resale of restricted securities after a specified hol-
ing period (typically six months to a year) to certain Qualified Institutional Buyers
(QIBs), which are generally large investment institutions that meet specific require-
ments outlined in the rule.4 Reporting requirements in the Rule 144A market are
significantly more relaxed that in the public markets, since the issuing company is
only required to provide “reasonably current” financial information, and no require-
ment to reconcile to U.S. GAAP exists. Therefore, Rule 144A creates a liquid market
for firms wishing to avoid SEC registration.
2.2 The Choice to Register with the SEC
Only a handful of papers examine a firm’s choice to register with the SEC, but a
consistent theme is that the registration choice is sensitive to the costs of complying
with regulation. For example, Bushee and Leuz (2005) find that over 75% of over-
the-counter market firms delisted in order to avoid complying with a 1999 expansion
of the Securities and Exchange Acts that would have required those firms to register
with the SEC. Leuz et al. (2008) find a large number of firms that deregistered
with the SEC in order to avoid complying with the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Similarly,
Gao (2011) finds that firms are more likely to issue bonds outside the United States
following the passage of SOX. But whether or not financial reporting requirements
impose a costly barrier to SEC registration remains an important and unanswered
question.
Several studies suggest that financial reporting and disclosure quality are key
determinants in firms’ choice to obtain public versus private debt. For example,
4Qualified Institutional Investors include regulated insurance companies, pension funds, regis-
tered investment companies, trusts, banks, and similar entities, with greater than $100 million in
discretionary investments. In order to qualify for Rule 144A, the selling firm must have good rea-
son to believe that the prospective buyer is a QIB, and must explicitly inform the buyer that they
intend to rely on Rule 144A for the continued resale of a restricted security.
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Bharath et al. (2008) find that firms with better accounting quality are more likely
to issue public as opposed to private debt. Baber and Gore (2008) find that munici-
palities in states that mandate GAAP accounting are more likely to issue public as
opposed to private debt. Finally, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that firms with greater
voluntary disclosures are also more likely to issue public as opposed to private debt.
Despite the consistent set of results, the inferences from these papers have only lim-
ited carryover to the current setting. These studies emphasize the informational
advantage of private lenders (e.g. relationship lending) amongst firms with already
public information, but otherwise do not examine the initial registration decision.
Very few papers investigate foreign issues into the Rule 144A market. Chaplinsky
and Ramchand (2004) find that the yield spread on Rule 144A foreign bonds is greater
than that of comparable registered bonds, which suggests that SEC registration
conveys a reduction in the cost of debt for at least some firms. Gao (2011) finds
that foreign firms are more likely to issue into the Rule 144A market following the
Sarbanes Oxley act, which suggests that Rule 144A can be used to avoid complying
with costly regulation.5
2.3 Existing Research on the SEC Rule Change
Existing studies on the SEC’s decision to remove the reconciliation requirement
for IFRS filings focus on the equity markets, and specifically on securities that were
registered both before and after the rule change. These cross-listings into the United
5Foreign Private Issuers appear to use Rule 144A differently from domestic firms. Fenn (2000)
suggests that domestic issuers of junk-bonds use Rule 144A to issue debt quickly, but not to avoid
SEC registration. He investigates a sample of speculative grade bonds issued between 1993 and 1998,
and finds that approximately 97% are eventually registered with the SEC. Fenn (2000) intentionally
excludes foreign bond issues from his analysis on the argument that many foreign firms still use
Rule 144A to avoid compliance with SEC disclosure completely, and therefore their securities remain
unregistered indefinitely. Indeed, given the costs of complying with other regulations such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many foreign firms issue into the Rule 144A market with no intent of ever
registering with the SEC, which is known in the practitioner literature as “Rule 144A for life”.
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States provide a natural setting within which to ask questions about how removing
the U.S. GAAP reconciliation affects the firm’s information environment. Interest-
ingly, the dominant finding is that the decision to remove the reconciliation came with
little loss to the firm’s information environment. For example, Jiang et al. (2010)
find no change in the market’s reaction to the Form 20-F after the rule change.6
Consistent with this, Kim et al. (2012) investigate a sample of 78 IFRS firms that
were cross-listed on U.S. exchanges both before and after the rule change, and find no
change in liquidity, the probability of informed trading (PIN), cost of equity, analysts
forecast error, bias, and dispersion, institutional ownership, and stock price efficiency
or synchronicity. In subsequent analysis, Kim et al. (2012) also find that the same
IFRS firms do not voluntarily continue the GAAP reconciliation, which suggests that
the reconciliation was probably more costly than it was worth.7 If anything, there
is some evidence to suggest that removing the U.S. GAAP reconciliation conveyed
a net benefit to investors. Chen and Khurana (2014) find positive abnormal returns
amongst cross-listed IFRS firms around key dates in the development of the SEC rule
change, which suggests that investors value the reduction in compliance costs over
the value of the disclosures in the reconciliation. Once again, inferences from the
existing studies are limited due to their focus on the equity markets and the sample
requirements to observe only those firms with registered securities both before and
after the rule change.
6While several studies find that the GAAP reconciliation contains value relevant information
(Amir et al., 1993; Bandyopadhyay et al., 1994; Barth and Clinch, 1996; Harris and Muller, 1999;
Henry et al., 2009), others claim that this information is available from sources other than the
reconciliation (Pope, 1993). Indeed, Rees and Elgers (1997) investigate a sample of foreign firm
registration statements with historical reconciliation of financial information, and find that the
reconciling items are value relevant even in the years when they weren’t disclosed. If the information
in the reconciliation is available from other sources, then removing this requirement should result
in little change to the informativeness of SEC filings.
7In another study, Yu (2011) uses textual analysis and finds some evidence that IFRS firms
increased the level of disclosure in the year immediately following the rule change, which suggests
that firms compensate for some loss of information in the year after the reconciliation is removed.
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Any theoretical prediction about a firm’s decision to register with the SEC re-
quires a careful understanding of the trade-off between the costs and benefits of
registration. Much of the existing literature argues that firms benefit from registra-
tion by bonding themselves to a regulatory regime that certifies a certain minimal
level of disclosure (Coffee Jr, 1998, 2002). Indeed, the documented benefits of regis-
tration are numerous, even amongst firms with existing reporting obligations abroad:
SEC registration is associated with better minority shareholder protections (Reese
and Weisbach, 2002), increased firm value (Doidge et al., 2004), and decreased cost
of capital (Hail and Leuz, 2009). Even within the bond market, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that yield spreads on registered Yankee bonds are less than that of
comparable Rule 144A issues (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004). But despite the
benefits of registration, one need only to notice that the vast majority of the world’s
corporations don’t register with the SEC to realize that costly barriers to registration
exist. One of the most significant costs of registration – especially for foreign firms –
is the additional disclosures themselves (Licht, 2003; Latham & Watkins LLP, 2013).
Since Rule 144A allows foreign firms to access the U.S. debt markets without reg-
istration, at least part of a firm’s decision to register is influenced by the disclosure
costs of regulation.
How investors respond to a change in disclosure costs is also important to pre-
dicting firm behavior, since part of a firm’s decision to disclose (e.g. register with the
SEC) anticipates this investor reaction. Theoretical work in the disclosure literature
suggests that – in the absence of disclosure costs – firms should want to disclose
their private information in order to avoid a negative investor reaction to withheld
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disclosure. Investors rationally expect that firms with good news want to disclose
it, and that firms with bad news try to hide it. This result, known in the economics
literature as the Unraveling Hypothesis (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981;
Milgrom, 1981), predicts that it is precisely this investor negative reaction to with-
held disclosure that drives firms to disclose more.1 Thus, in the absence of disclosure
costs, investors might infer that firms use Rule 144A to avoid registration and hide
bad news, which in turn should drive all firms to register with the SEC.
The key result of the Unraveling Hypothesis changes in the presence of disclosure
costs. When disclosure is costly, investors can no longer infer that withheld disclo-
sure is a signal of bad news, because investors understand that firms might withhold
information only to avoid incurring the disclosure costs. This argument was ana-
lytically modeled by Verrecchia (1983), who investigates both a firm’s decision to
disclose and investors’ reaction to withheld disclosure under a change in disclosure
costs, and makes two theoretical predictions:
1. Firms disclose more (less) when disclosure costs are reduced (increased).
2. Investors react more (less) negatively to the withheld disclosure when disclosure
costs are decreased (increased).
Taken together, both predictions suggest that a decrease in disclosure costs leads to
market unraveling: firms will volunteer more disclosure, and investors will react more
negatively if they don’t. Thus, if one could compare a high to low cost disclosure
1The theories of Grossman and Hart (1980) and Grossman (1981) also require that investors
know about the existence (but not the nature) of private information, and that firms cannot lie
in their disclosures. Both of these assumptions would be satisfied in the current setting since
SEC registration is an observable firm choice, and since all sales of financial securities – both
public and private – are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts.
Issuing corporations are prohibited from making false or misleading statements, or from omitting
information if, as a result of the omission, the information provided would be false or misleading.
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regime change, then one should observe more firm disclosure and greater investor
negative reaction to withheld disclosure.
An important highlight of the above argument is that the Unraveling Hypothesis
does not predict that investors will react any differently to a change in disclosure
costs in the condition that the firm provides the disclosure. Said differently, the the-
oretical argument predicts that investors react more negatively following a decrease
in disclosure costs, but only in the condition that disclosures are withheld. This
is because investors do not infer anything about the nature of information that is
disclosed. Thus, an implicit prediction of the above argument is that:
3. Investors react no differently to dislosures when disclosure costs are decreased
(increased).
Several features of the current setting fit the framework developed by the argu-
ments above. Investors cannot unambiguously infer that firms issue into the Rule
144A market to hide bad news, because some firms might only want to avoid the
disclosure costs of SEC registration. If the rule change to allow IFRS reporting with-
out a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reduces these disclosure costs, then more firms
should register with the SEC, and investors will react more negatively to those firms
that don’t.
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 The Probability of SEC Registration
I investigate the probability of registering a bond issue with the SEC using both
mandatory adoption of IFRS at the country level, and the recent SEC rule change to
allow IFRS reporting, as sources of exogenous variation in disclosure requirements.
The primary specification is a difference-in-difference-in-differences design, whereby
bond issues from IFRS countries experience pre- to post- period changes in the
probability of registration following the SEC rule change. This setting allows for
estimation of the following linear model:1
yi,j,t = αj + γt + β1(IFRSj,t) + β2(IFRSj,t) · (Postt) + i,j,t (4.1)
where yi,j,t is a binary variable indicating SEC registration for the ith bond from
country j, in year t. Fixed effects are included at the country, αj, and year, γt,
levels. IFRSj,t is a binary variable indicating if country j requires IFRS reporting in
year t, and Postt is a binary variable indicating the years when the SEC allows IFRS
filings. All other (un)observed variables are captured in i,j,t. The main coefficient
of interest is β2, which measures the change in the probability of registering with the
SEC for bonds from countries with mandatory IFRS in the period after the SEC’s
rule change. The main effects for IFRSj and Postt are subsumed by the country
and year fixed-effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on country.2
1This equation estimates a linear probability model in cases where the dependent variable is a bi-
nary outcome. The coefficients of a linear probability model recover marginal effects, as opposed to
the coefficients of a probit or logit model, which recover structural parameters of an assumed cumu-
lative probability distribution function. Wooldridge (2010, p.563) points out that linear probability
models often do a very good job when the main objective is to estimate marginal effects.
2There are too few years to also cluster by year.
16
Two advantages of this research design are worth emphasizing. First, IFRS re-
porting is measured at the country-level, instead of the firm-level, in order to capture
exogenous variation in accounting standards caused by changes in the countries own
reporting requirements. If the accounting standard were measured at the firm-level,
then this measure would capture the firm’s reporting choice, which could introduce
an endogeneity bias into the model. The model does not ignore the possibility that
firms could voluntarily choose to report using IFRS in the absence of country level
reporting requirements; only that those reporting choices would be endogenous.
The second advantage of using country-level reporting requirements is that it
does not rely on controlling for firm-level characteristics for identification. This is
particularly advantageous in the current setting, when sample firms either cannot be
matched to their home-country financial statements, or when their home-country fi-
nancial statements are not publicly available. Indeed, a large number of firms issuing
into the Rule 144A market are not only more likely to avoid public disclosure require-
ments in the U.S., but are also more likely to avoid public disclosure requirements
in their home country as well. Thus, relying on country-level sources of exogenous
variation relaxes the sample requirements. If anything, restricting the sample to
include only firms with identifiable characteristics could potentially bias the sample
selection process towards firms with already existing public disclosures.3
4.2 Cost of Debt and Credit Rating
I also examine the bond’s cost of debt and credit rating as a function of changes
in country-level financial reporting requirements. The hypotheses predict that the
rule change will have a different effect in the Yankee bond market than it will in
3As discussed in the sample and data selection, most U.S. bond issues cannot be matched to
their home-country financial statements because of differences in the security numbering system
used in the United States versus abroad. Restricting the sample to include only those bonds with
matched data results in significant sample attrition.
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the Rule 144A market. Therefore, the cost of debt and credit ratings are estimated
using a system of equations:4
y∗SEC=1 = β
′
1x+ 1 (4.2a)
y∗SEC=0 = β
′
2x+ 2 (4.2b)
where y∗SEC=1 is the cost of debt (credit rating) available in the Yankee bond market,
and y∗SEC=0 is the cost of debt (credit rating) available in the Rule 144A market. The
right hand side of the equations, β′1x and β
′
2x, represent the same specification as in
equation (4.1), but where the coefficients are allowed to differ between the Yankee
and Rule 144A markets.
The main econometric problem faced when estimating the above system of equa-
tions is that we only ever observe y∗SEC=1 or y
∗
SEC=0, but never both, depending on
which market the bond is issued into. If we wish to estimate the effect of the rule
change on two separate markets, then we would ideally observe the consequences
for the same bond in both markets. The model is complicated by the fact that
each firm endogenously selects which market to issue the bond into. Because of
this self-selection problem, OLS estimation of the system of equations would yield
inconsistent estimates.
I use an endogenous switching model in order to obtain consistent estimation of
the parameters in equation (4.2).5 The model begins by specifying a selection rule,
whereby each firm chooses to register the bond with the SEC when the net benefit
4Throughout the paper, I use an * to indicate a latent variable. Firm, country, and year
subscripts are suppressed in order to make the notation more clear.
5Endogenous switching models are derived in Maddala (1986, p.257), but also discussed in
Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.555) and Li and Prabhala (2005). Endogenous switching models are
also known as Roy (1951) models in the economics literature. See Kwan and Carleton (2010) for
an example of such a model applied to the choice between private versus public debt.
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of doing so is positive. The selection rule is:
SEC =

1 if pi∗ > 0
0 if pi∗ ≤ 0
(4.3)
where pi∗ is a new latent variable that captures the unobservable net benefit of regis-
tering with the SEC. Intuitively, a firm observes the potential outcome of registering
the bond, y∗SEC=1, and the potential outcome of private placement, y
∗
SEC=0, and
considers the difference between the two potential outcomes when deciding which
market to the issue the bond into. At least part of the net benefit is the difference
between these potential outcomes, less any compliance costs. Thus, the net benefit
function is specified as:
pi∗ = (y∗SEC=1 − y∗SEC=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Diff. in Potential Outcomes
−γ′z + η (4.4)
where z is some exogenous registration cost. This equation demonstrates the unique
advantage of the model, because it assumes that firms can observe the difference in
potential outcomes, and then choose the market with the best terms available. Sub-
stituting equations (4.2a) and (4.2b) into equation (4.4) yields the following reduced
form equation:
pi∗ = (β′1x− β′2x+ z′γ) + (1 − 2 + η) (4.5)
which is now specified as a linear function of observable characteristics from equation
(4.2), and an exogenous determinant of compliance costs from equation (4.4). The
main point of equation (4.5) is to demonstrate that the unobservable net benefit of
registration can be expressed as a linear function of observable variables.
Estimation of the model utilizes the familiar result from Heckman (1976), who
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demonstrates that an expectation, conditional upon a linear selection rule as in
equation (4.3), can be estimated with a two step procedure. First, estimate the
probability of SEC registration with a probit model. Second, augment the second-
stage linear regression with an inverse Mills ratio, which is a function of the predicted
probabilities from the first-stage probit. Thus, the final system of equations to
estimate is:
E[y|x, SEC = 1] = x′β1 + ρ1 · λ(w′pˆi) (4.6a)
E[y|x, SEC = 0] = x′β2 + ρ2 · λ(−w′pˆi) (4.6b)
where w contains all the unique regressors from equation (4.5), pˆi contains the pre-
dicted coefficients from the first stage probit model, and λ(·) is the inverse Mills ratio
function.
The main advantage of an endogenous switching model is that it recovers more
useful estimates of the (unobserved) counterfactual outcome (Li and Prabhala, 2005).
If a firm issues a Yankee bond, then we observe ySEC=1. But the endogenous switching
model allows us to estimate what the effect of the rule change would have been on
the outcome ySEC=0, had the firm issued a Rule 144A bond instead. Thus, the
interpretation of coefficients is straightforward: β1 measures the effect of x on y, had
the bond been issued into the Yankee market, while β2 measures the effect of x on y,
had the bond been issued into the Rule 144A market.
Equation (4.4) requires an instrument, z, that proxies for the cost of registration.6
I use the presence of an existing SEC reporting obligation as the excluded instrument
6Strictly speaking, the inverse Mills ratio does not require an excluded instrument for identi-
fication. However, estimating the inverse Mills ratio without an instrument relies exclusively on
an assumption of multivariate normally distributed errors (Lennox et al., 2011). Regardless, my
results are unchanged when I do not use an excluded instrument, and when I use the bond features
as set of excluded instruments.
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when calculating the inverse Mills ratio above. If the firm already files annually with
the SEC, then the marginal cost of registering the bond issue is much smaller than if
the firm was reporting for the first time. A firm can have an existing SEC reporting
obligation from either a previous debt issuance, or from a previous cross-listing. I
determine the status of cross-listed equity from a listing of sponsored ADRs from
J.P. Morgan.7 I consider a previous bond issue to create a reporting obligation if (a)
the previous bond issue was registered with the SEC, and (b) the secondary bond
issue was offered before the previous bond issue matures.
7https://www.adr.com. J.P. Morgan covers over 95% of American Depository Receipts listed by
Citibank, Bank of New York (Mellon), and Deutsche Bank. I use J.P. Morgan exclusively because
only this listing provides effective and termination dates, as well as sponsorship status.
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5. SAMPLE AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
The main sample of bonds is obtained from Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database (FISD), which is used because of its extensive coverage of U.S. bond issues,
including data on Rule 144A status and SEC registration. I start with all bonds in
FISD that are issued by corporations domiciled outside of the United States, and
are either a registered Yankee Bond, or else specifically marked as exempt by Rule
144A. I exclude corporations from financial services industries, as well as municipal
and government bond issues.1 My main sample includes all foreign bond issues
between 2000 and 2013.
I also identify several bond characteristic for each issue in FISD. I include a binary
variable, Floating Rate Coupon, to indicate if the coupon payments periodically reset.
I also include a binary variable to indicate if the bond is Callable, and a binary
variable indicate if the bond is Putable. In order to capture differences in the bond’s
repayment terms, I include measures for the bond’s Duration and Convexity, whose
calculations are defined in Appendix A.
Each bond’s cost of debt and credit rating is measured following Qi et al. (2010).
The cost of debt is calculated by first measuring the bond’s yield based on sales price,
coupon rate, and time to maturity. Because the bond’s yield depends on assuming
a fixed coupon rate, I exclude all floating coupon rate bonds from this calculation. I
then subtract the corresponding risk-free rate from the bond yield, where the risk-free
rate is obtained from a Treasury security with a corresponding time-to-maturity as
reported by the Federal Reserve’s H.15 Daily Interest Rates report. The bond rating
1A small subset of foreign Rule 144A bonds are eventually registered with the SEC. I classify
all bonds issued under Rule 144A, but that were eventually registered with the SEC, as a Yankee
bond. Therefore, the only bonds classified as a Rule 144A private placement are specifically labeled
as “Not Registered” by Mergent FISD.
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is obtained by converting credit ratings to a numerical value from zero to twenty-one.
When more than one rating is available from each of the three bond rating agencies -
Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poors - the bond rating is the mean of all available
values.
With respect to home-country level variables, mandatory IFRS adoption dates
are collected from a number of sources. I primarily rely on hand-collected dates from
the IFRS Foundation and International Accounting Standards Board. The IFRS
Foundation publishes convergence reports for most countries, which include the IFRS
convergence status and adoption dates, when available. I also collect adoption dates
from Hail and Leuz (2007) and Christensen et al. (2013).2
In additional analysis, I also explore cross-sectional variation with respect to
country-level indicators of legal and disclosure regulation. I study legal origin, cred-
itor rights, and disclosure requirements. English Legal Origin is a binary variable
equal to one if the issuing country’s legal origin is English, and equal to zero other-
wise, obtained from Djankov et al. (2007). Creditor Rights is a variable that ranges
from zero to four, increasing in the strength of the country’s creditor rights, as de-
fined by La Porta et al. (1997) and obtained from Djankov et al. (2007). Disclosure
Requirements, which measures the extent to which home-country laws require dis-
closure, is obtained from La Porta et al. (2006). Each of the country variables are
measured once at the beginning of the sample period, and do not change over the
sample period. Because these country-level measures are not observed for all coun-
tries in my initial sample, a caveat of the cross sectional analysis is that each model
can only be estimated on the subset of countries for which data is available.
2The adoption date reflects mandatory adoption of IFRS as issued by the IASB, and does not
include non-IASB versions of IFRS. When IFRS is phased in over multiple dates, I use the date for
which IFRS is required for large and publicly traded companies because this date best captures the
reporting requirement for firms accessing capital markets.
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Although the identification strategy does not rely on using firm-level character-
istics for estimation, I obtain this data for a subsample of firms from Compustat
Global.3 The main challenge in matching bonds to firm fundamentals is that the
CUSIP number assigned to a U.S. issued bond does not necessarily correspond with
company identifiers issued in other countries (e.g. SEDOL, ISIN).4 Thus, firm-level
characteristics are only available when a correspondence is recorded by the data ven-
dor. As such, any intersection with firm-level characteristics significantly reduces the
sample, and potentially biases the results towards large firms with already available
public disclosures. This is particularly concerning when foreign firms are not listed in
either their home market or U.S. market. For example, Chaplinsky and Ramchand
(2004) document that over 60% of international 144A issuers do not have public
sources of financial information. Of all the bonds in my initial sample, I match 512
to firm characteristics.5 For this subsample of firms, I obtain Firm Size, measured
as the log of total assets, market-to-book (MTB), and return on assets (ROA).
3Coverage with Datastream/Worldscope was found to be comparable.
4I am grateful to Alice Heerse at Standard & Poors for phone calls confirming this case.
5My sample of bonds matched to firm characteristics is comparable to existing studies. Miller and
Puthenpurackal (2002) obtains a sample of 260 Yankee bonds issued from 1987 to 1998 matched to
firm characteristics, but does not obtain a sample of Rule 144A bonds. Chaplinsky and Ramchand
(2004) obtain a sample of 195 Rule 144A bonds issued between 1991 to 1997, but otherwise do not
obtain a sample of Yankee bonds. Gao (2011) obtains a sample of 296 Yankee bonds and 353 Rule
144A bonds issued over the years 1990 to 2006.
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6. RESULTS
6.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Figure 6.1 presents the total offering amount of both U.S. domestic and foreign
bond issues in FISD from 1990 to 2013. While foreign issues comprise less than
half of the total dollar value of bond issues in any given year, the dollar value of the
foreign market is still economically significant. The figure also suggests that the SEC
rule change in 2008 did not dramatically affect the dollar volume of foreign bonds, as
evidenced by the similar time-series trend between both foreign and U.S. domestic
bond issues.
Figure 6.2 presents the percentage of U.S. domestic and foreign bonds issued into
the Rule 144A market from 1990 to 2013. Interestingly, the near majority of foreign
bonds are issued into the Rule 144A market before the SEC rule change. The years
after the SEC rule change show a dramatic shift in the registration rate of foreign
bonds, but no comparable shift in the registration rate of U.S. domestic bonds. In
fact, in the years following the SEC rule change, the percentage of foreign bonds
issued into the Rule 144A market is nearly comparable to that of U.S. domestic
bonds. Thus, the figure presents some of the first evidence that foreign bonds are
more likely to register with the SEC in the years following the SEC rule change.
Figure 6.3 presents the frequency of foreign bonds issued into each of the public
Yankee and Rule 144A markets from 1990 to 2013. The results corroborate the
inferences from Figure 6.2, and suggest a dramatic shift in the rate at which foreign
bonds register with the SEC following the rule change to allow IFRS filings.
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used throughout the anal-
ysis. The unconditional probability of registering with the SEC is 74 percent for the
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Figure 6.1: Offering amount of bonds covered by Mergent.
entire sample of bonds. Of all the bonds in the sample, 53 percent originate from
countries with mandatory IFRS reporting. The mean cost of debt is 2.71 percent
above the corresponding risk-free rate, and the mean bond rating is equivalent to an
BBB (investment grade) rated bond. Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics when
split by market type and sample period. Panel A presents the difference between
Rule 144A and Yankee bond issues. The two markets are statistically different along
several dimensions, but the differences are economically small. For example, Yankee
bonds have lower cost of debt, but only by about 32 basis points. Differences in the
credit rating of bonds in both markets is similarly small. The average Rule 144A
bond is rated BBB+, while the average Yankee bond is rated BBB, which yields sta-
26
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f R
ul
e 
14
4A
 Is
su
es
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Domestic Foreign
Figure 6.2: Domestic versus foreign use of Rule 144A
tistically different means but not statistically different medians. One striking finding
is that bonds from countries with mandatory IFRS are no more or less likely to ap-
pear in one market or another. Panel B presents differences in means and medians
when split by sample period. Consistent with the global adoption of IFRS, less than
a majority of bonds issued between 2000 to 2007 were issued from countries with
mandatory IFRS, while the greater majority of bonds issued between 2008 and 2013
were from IFRS countries. Consistent with the 2008 financial crisis, there was a 144
basis point increase in the cost of debt, and small decrease in credit ratings. One
interesting observation is the large shift in SEC registrations, from only 68 percent
of bond issues in the pre-period to 90 percent of bond issues in the post period.
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Figure 6.3: Frequency of foreign bond issues by year
6.2 Probability of SEC Registration
Table 6.3 presents the results of estimating various versions of equation (4.1),
which predict the probability of registering the bond issue with the SEC as a func-
tion of the change in reporting requirements. Model (1) includes the full sample
of foreign bonds while controlling for bond characteristics. The coefficient on the
interaction between IFRS and the SEC Post period is positive and statistically sig-
nificant, which suggests that firms from IFRS countries are more likely to register
their bond with the SEC following the rule change. I also re-estimate the main re-
sults for two sub-samples of bonds, which exclude highly influential countries. Model
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Table 6.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
x¯ σ Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
SEC Registered 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00
Mandatory IFRS 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Cost of Debt 2.70 3.05 0.90 2.30 4.75
Bond Rating 14.98 5.07 10.50 15.00 19.00
Floating Coupon 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
Putable 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
Callable 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Duration 5.68 3.34 3.94 5.33 7.11
Convexity 58.69 74.96 20.71 38.00 66.10
Face Value (millions) 0.43 1.48 0.11 0.25 0.50
English Legal Origin 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Creditor Rights 1.99 1.35 1.00 2.00 3.00
Disclosure Requirements 0.66 0.21 0.50 0.75 0.83
Firm Size 8.59 2.04 7.39 8.63 9.99
MTB 2.67 3.51 0.98 1.76 3.23
ROA 0.01 0.17 -0.00 0.03 0.07
(2) excludes all bonds issued from Canada, because Canadian corporations benefit
from the Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System. Model (3) excludes all bonds from
the Cayman Islands, since bonds issued from the Cayman Islands are likely from
corporate subsidiaries. Importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term for bonds
issued from IFRS countries in the period after the SEC rule change remains statis-
tically significant and positive.
Model (4) presents the results when excluding controls for bond-characteristics.
A potential concern is that the bond characteristics are themselves endogenous func-
tions of the accounting rule changes. For example, Ball et al. (2015) argue that IFRS
adoption decreased the contractability of financial statements, and that IFRS firms
rely more on debt covenants to borrow funds than non-IFRS firms. If this is true,
then controlling for bond characteristics could inadvertently block the path between
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Table 6.2: Comparison Between Rule 144A and Yankee Markets
Panel A: Comparison Between Yankee and Rule 144A Bond Issues
Rule 144A Yankee Differences In...
Mean Median Mean Median Mean (p-value) Median (p-value)
Mandatory IFRS 0.52 1.00 0.54 1.00 -0.01 0.43 0.00 .
Cost of Debt 2.93 2.77 2.62 2.22 0.32 0.01 0.55 0.00
Bond Rating 15.89 15.50 14.64 15.00 1.25 0.00 0.50 0.16
Floating Coupon 0.38 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
Putable 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Callable 0.50 1.00 0.58 1.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 .
Duraction 4.84 5.15 5.98 5.43 -1.15 0.00 -0.28 0.00
Convexity 45.41 35.72 63.44 39.14 -18.03 0.00 -3.42 0.04
Face Value (millions) 0.33 0.15 0.47 0.30 -0.13 0.01 -0.15 0.00
Firm Size 7.51 7.71 9.00 9.03 -1.49 0.00 -1.31 0.00
MTB 2.57 1.62 2.71 1.85 -0.14 0.64 -0.22 0.27
ROA -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Panel B: Comparison Between Pre- and Post-SEC Rule Change
2000-2007 2008-2013 Differences In...
Mean Median Mean Median Mean (p-value) Median (p-value)
SEC Registered 0.68 1.00 0.90 1.00 -0.21 0.00 0.00 .
Mandatory IFRS 0.44 0.00 0.79 1.00 -0.36 0.00 -1.00 .
Cost of Debt 2.27 1.81 3.70 3.00 -1.44 0.00 -1.19 0.00
Bond Rating 15.29 15.17 14.15 15.00 1.13 0.00 0.17 0.02
Floating Coupon 0.28 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
Putable 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Callable 0.50 1.00 0.71 1.00 -0.21 0.00 0.00 .
Duration 5.55 5.33 5.99 5.31 -0.44 0.00 0.02 0.93
Convexity 58.05 38.68 60.19 36.70 -2.14 0.43 1.97 0.16
Face Value (millions) 0.32 0.20 0.74 0.50 -0.43 0.00 -0.30 0.00
Firm Size 8.08 8.26 9.58 9.82 -1.50 0.00 -1.56 0.00
MTB 2.93 1.90 2.20 1.49 0.73 0.01 0.41 0.01
ROA -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.00
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Table 6.3: Predicting the Probability of Registering with the SEC Following the Rule
Change
Full Bond Sample Compustat Merged Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full
Sample
Without
Canada
Without
Cayman
Islands
Without
Bond
Features
Without
Firm
Controls
With
Firm
Controls
Mandatory IFRS 0.012 0.013 0.080∗∗ 0.021 0.129∗∗ -0.052
(0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.062) (0.055) (0.048)
Mandatory IFRS × Post 0.147∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.189∗∗ -0.005 0.104∗∗
(0.050) (0.046) (0.029) (0.094) (0.064) (0.046)
Floating Coupon -0.003 -0.005 0.187∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.122) (0.027) (0.078) (0.044)
Putable -0.147∗ -0.145∗ -0.165∗∗ -0.142 -0.069
(0.075) (0.085) (0.080) (0.101) (0.087)
Callable -0.034 -0.043 -0.008 0.068∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.021) (0.037) (0.037)
Duration 0.109∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012)
Convexity -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Face Value -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.007 0.081∗∗ 0.035
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.036) (0.037)
Firm Size 0.057∗∗∗
(0.008)
MTB -0.007
(0.006)
ROA -0.070
(0.081)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2701 2419 2238 3402 503 393
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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the variables of interest as the outcome variable. As already noted in Table 6.2, each
of the Yankee and Rule 144A markets differ systematically with respect to bond
characteristics. The extent to which market choice is a function of bond character-
istics, or vice versa, is unknown. Regardless, the coefficient on the interaction term
remains positive and statistically significant.
Models (5) and (6) present the results on the subsample of firms matched to
Compustat Global. As discussed above, sample attrition is a primary concern when
using a sample of bonds matched to firm characteristics. Indeed, the sample size
drops from 2,701 in Model (1) to 503 in Model (5), and 393 in Model (6). This
sample attrition could also bias results towards those firms with already publicly
available information, which is particularly hazardous when studying the decision to
disclose or not.
The coefficient on the SEC rule change is not statistically significant in Model
(5), but statistically significant and positive in Model (6). Inferences from the sub-
sample of bonds matched to firm level controls are difficult to interpret. The massive
attrition in sample size raises concerns about the aforementioned sample bias. The
observation that inferences are sensitive to the inclusion of controls is consistent with
this explanation. Because unbiased estimation does not rely on these controls, the
remainder of the analysis uses the full sample of bonds.
It is interesting to note that home-country IFRS adoption is only weakly associ-
ated with an increased probability of registration. The coefficient on IFRS adoption
is statistically significant and positive in Models (3) and (5), but not in any of the
other models. Collectively, these results provide only some evidence to suggest that
home-country IFRS adoption increases the probability of registering with the SEC,
but strong results to suggest that the SEC’s rule change to allow IFRS filings signif-
icantly increased the probability of registration.
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6.3 Cross Country Characteristics
Existing literature suggests a strong link between market participation and the
legal protections afforded to investors. For example, La Porta et al. (1997) find that
capital markets are more developed in countries with better securities laws, while
La Porta et al. (2006) claim that home-country securities laws facilitate contracting
between the investor and the investee. Indeed, cross-sectional differences in the legal
environment have also been used to explain the capital market benefits of IFRS
adoption. For example, Daske et al. (2008) find that mandatory IFRS adoption
improves market liquidity, but only amongst those countries with already strong
enforcement mechanisms.1 In more related literature, Qi et al. (2010) find that
home-country legal protections and disclosure practices affect foreign bonds’ cost of
debt and credit rating.
While the existing literature motivates the investigation of cross-sectional differ-
ences due to legal and enforcement mechanisms, the exact theoretical prediction of
how home-country differences will affect market choice in the United States is less
clear. Consider the initial adoption of IFRS as an example. A common concern
is that IFRS is not uniformly adopted across all countries (Ball, 2006), with some
countries adopting IFRS more seriously, while other countries adopt IFRS in name
only (Daske et al., 2013). On one hand, if countries with strong legal and enforce-
ment mechanisms adopt IFRS more seriously, then firms from those countries might
encounter a smaller marginal cost of registering with the SEC. On the other hand,
countries with stronger legal and enforcement mechanisms might substitute IFRS for
SEC registration if investors view IFRS as a similar commitment to disclosure (Leuz
1Christensen et al. (2013) argue that the adoption of mandatory IFRS is concurrent with changes
in legal and enforcement mechanisms, while Barth and Israeli (2013) conclude that both IFRS and
enforcement mechanisms are most effective when combined together.
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and Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz, 2003). Predictions with respect to the SEC rule change
are similarly difficult to construct.
Table 6.4 presents the results of re-estimating equation (4.1) with interactions
for country-level measures of investor protections. The three country-level variables
include English Law, Creditor Rights, and Disclosure Requirements. Interestingly,
the coefficient on the interaction between Mandatory IFRS and the SEC rule change
is not statistically significant for all firms, but statistically significant and positive for
firms with English common law origin, strong creditor rights, and greater disclosure
requirements. Thus, the results suggest that the SEC rule change had the great-
est effect on those bonds from countries with already strong legal and enforcement
mechanisms. Interestingly, the main effect of initial IFRS adoption is statistically
significant and positive across all three models, which suggests that initial IFRS adop-
tion increases the probability of registering with the SEC. However, the interaction
of IFRS and the country-level proxies is statistically significant and negative in two
of the three models. The combination of these coefficients would suggest that IFRS
adoption increases the probability of SEC registration amongst firms from countries
with weak investor protections, but not amongst firms from countries with already
strong investor protections.
The results from Table 6.4 present a consistent picture: IFRS adoption increases
the probability of SEC registration, but only amongst those firms from countries with
weak investor protections. Firms from countries with strong investor protections are
not any more likely to register with the SEC until after the rule change to allow
IFRS filings. This pattern is consistent with the existing literature in the equity
markets. Reese and Weisbach (2002) find that foreign firms from countries with
weak investor protections are more likely to rely on SEC registration in order to
convey a credible commitment to disclosure, while foreign firms from countries with
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Table 6.4: Cross Sectional Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
English Law Creditor Rights
Disclosure
Requirements
Mandatory IFRS 0.106∗∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.247∗
(0.040) (0.061) (0.130)
Mandatory IFRS × Country Var -0.164∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.328∗
(0.049) (0.022) (0.183)
Mandatory IFRS × Post × Country Var 0.154∗∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.296∗
(0.053) (0.024) (0.157)
Mandatory IFRS × Post -0.013 -0.049 -0.135
(0.032) (0.058) (0.108)
Country Var × Post -0.055 0.008 -0.134
(0.052) (0.021) (0.158)
Floating Coupon 0.043 0.043 0.041
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Putable -0.111 -0.101 -0.099
(0.088) (0.085) (0.105)
Callable -0.059∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Duration 0.006 0.007 0.005
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Convexity -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Face Value -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2030 2030 1833
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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strong investor protection are more opportunistic, and will register with the SEC
only when accessing the public market provides better financing.
6.4 Cost of Debt Capital and Credit Rating
Table 6.5 presents the results of estimating the bond’s cost of debt capital in
both the Yankee and Rule 144A markets. The Yankee market model includes only
those bonds registered with the SEC, while the Rule 144A market model includes
only unregistered bonds. Models (1) through (4) present OLS estimates as a basis of
comparison, but as previously mentioned, OLS will yield inconsistent estimates when
firms endogenously choose which market to issue the bond into. Unsurprisingly, the
coefficient on the SEC rule change is not statistically significant.
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Table 6.5: Predicting the Cost of Debt Capital
OLS Endogenous Switching
Yankee Rule 144A Yankee Rule 144A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mandatory IFRS 0.533∗ 0.607 0.052 -0.983 0.549 0.799 0.321 -0.843
(0.307) (0.379) (0.660) (0.779) (0.365) (0.538) (0.877) (0.845)
Mandatory IFRS × Post 0.156 0.215 3.053 3.591 0.141 -0.110 4.030∗∗ 5.558∗∗
(0.270) (0.390) (2.527) (2.279) (0.371) (0.556) (1.792) (2.097)
Putable -0.839 0.299 -1.020 0.090
(0.855) (0.495) (0.981) (0.521)
Callable 0.705∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.221) (0.252) (0.136)
Duration -0.620∗∗∗ -0.476 -0.605∗∗∗ -0.414
(0.112) (0.478) (0.135) (0.470)
Convexity 0.016∗∗∗ 0.004 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017)
Face Value -0.690∗∗∗ -1.098∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -1.093∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.169) (0.160) (0.178)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.487 -1.218 -0.847 -1.523
(1.259) (0.783) (0.935) (0.917)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1593 1600 462 463 1385 1393 460 462
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Models (6) through (8) present the results of estimating the system of equations
using the endogenous switching model described in Section 4. The main difference
is the inclusion of an inverse Mills ratio. The coefficient on the SEC rule change is
statistically significant and positive, but only in the Rule 144A market. The results
suggest that the SEC rule change increased the cost of debt available to IFRS firms
in the Rule 144A market. The significance in Models (7) and (8), when compared
to Models (3) and (4), highlights the importance of accounting for the endogenous
choice of market in the research design.
The finding that the SEC rule change does not affect the cost of debt available
in the Yankee bond market is also consistent with theoretical predictions. Investors
make no inference about the presence of bad news when disclosures are provided
(i.e. registered with the SEC). Only in the condition that disclosure is withheld will
a decrease in disclosure costs lead investors to infer a greater likelihood that the firm
is hiding bad news. Indeed, the null effect of the rule change in the public market
is consistent with existing studies. Recall that Kim et al. (2012) find that the rule
change does not affect the cost of equity capital amongst cross-listing firms on U.S.
stock exchanges.
The results are overall consistent with the Unraveling Hypothesis. Prior to the
2008, the requirement to reconcile home-country financial statements to U.S. GAAP
imposed a costly disclosure requirement on SEC registration. Accordingly, some firms
issued into the Rule 144A market only to avoid these disclosure costs. Investors could
not unambiguously infer that firms in the Rule 144A market were hiding bad news
because investors knew that some firms were simply avoiding costly disclosures. The
SEC rule change to allow IFRS financial statements without reconciliation reduced
the disclosure requirements for some firms. Investors were aware of this decrease in
disclosure costs and so inferred with greater likelihood the existence of bad news,
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had those firms issued into the Rule 144A market following the rule change. This
unobserved investor reaction similarly drove firms from IFRS countries to register
their bond issues with the SEC.
It is also interesting to observe that IFRS adoption does not affect the cost of
debt in either market. Existing literature presents conflicting results as to the effect
of IFRS on cost of capital. For example, Florou and Kosi (2013) find that IFRS
decreases the cost of debt amongst European bond issues, but Bhat et al. (2014)
find that IFRS adoption does not affect the pricing of credit risk. There is also some
evidence to suggest that IFRS was detrimental to debt financing. Ball et al. (2015)
find that IFRS adoption decreases the number of accounting based covenants used
in debt contracts, which suggests that IFRS leads to less contactable information.
Consistent with this claim, Chen et al. (2015) find that IFRS adoption increases the
cost of debt capital on a global sample of private bank loans. Based on this existing
literature, there is no reason to expect how IFRS adoption should affect cost of debt
one way or another.
Table 6.6 presents the results of estimating the bond’s credit rating in both the
Yankee and Rule 144A markets. Similar to Table 6.5, the OLS estimates are pre-
sented as a basis of comparison. The coefficients of interest are no different from zero
in either Models (1) through (4). Models (5) through (8) present the results of the
endogenous switching model. The coefficient on the SEC rule change is statistically
significant and negative in the Rule 144A market, but not in the public Yankee bond
market. The finding suggests that the SEC rule change decreased the credit rat-
ings available in the Rule 144A market for firms from IFRS countries. These results
largely confirm the inferences from Table 6.5. Investors perceive less creditworthi-
ness amongst bonds issued into the private placement market when the cost of their
registration is lowered.
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Table 6.6: Predicting Bond Credit Rating
OLS Endogenous Switching
Yankee Rule 144A Yankee Rule 144A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mandatory IFRS -0.134 0.128 -0.118 0.261 -0.289 0.114 -0.781 -0.049
(0.677) (0.676) (1.124) (1.392) (0.909) (0.946) (1.269) (1.267)
Mandatory IFRS × Post -0.970 -1.097∗ -6.512 -4.438 -0.853 -1.374 -9.132∗∗∗ -13.775∗∗∗
(0.669) (0.654) (4.097) (4.356) (0.941) (0.930) (3.249) (4.059)
Putable -0.858 -3.262∗∗ -1.305∗ -2.839∗
(0.774) (1.277) (0.710) (1.422)
Callable -1.884∗∗∗ -2.198∗∗∗ -2.165∗∗∗ -1.759∗∗∗
(0.531) (0.329) (0.510) (0.259)
Duration -0.215 -0.570 -0.161 -0.738
(0.330) (0.965) (0.271) (0.979)
Convexity 0.015 0.039 0.014 0.044
(0.011) (0.034) (0.009) (0.035)
Face Value 1.332∗∗∗ 2.056∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ 2.065∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.598) (0.251) (0.602)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.716 0.022 2.211∗ 6.387∗∗∗
(1.887) (2.461) (1.163) (1.609)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1559 1834 450 454 1356 1356 448 453
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I investigate how a significant change in SEC disclosure require-
ments affects foreign firm’s decision to register U.S. bond issues, and the associated
investor reaction from failing to do so. Specifically, I investigate the capital market
consequences of the SEC’s recent decision to allow International Financial Report-
ing Standards for foreign firm registrants, which was a significant change from the
previous requirement that all firms report or reconcile to U.S. GAAP. The event also
provides a unique exogenous shock to the registration costs of a subset of foreign
firms, and allows me to test theoretical arguments predicting an increase in SEC
registration and the associated negative reaction to private placements.
The research is important for several reasons. First, this study sheds light on the
U.S. market for foreign bonds, which is not only an economically significant source
of global financing, but due to its unique institutional details is an understudied area
in the accounting literature. Second, this study suggests some capital market conse-
quence to the SEC rule change where existing studies find no effect (Kim et al., 2012).
Ongoing critical debate within both the academic and practitioner literature about
the consequences of a dual reporting regime merits the study of the consequences
of this regulation. Finally, the setting provides a unique setting within which to
test theoretical predictions about how both firms and investors react to a change in
disclosure costs (Verrecchia, 1983).
Using country level adoption of mandatory IFRS and the recent SEC rule change
as plausibly exogenous shocks to foreign firm reporting requirements, I use a difference-
in-difference-in-differences design and find that firms are significantly more likely to
register the bonds following the SEC rule change. The effect is not only statistically
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significant and robust, but economically meaningful as well. Furthermore, cross-
sectional analysis suggests that this effect is strongest amongst those bonds issued
from countries with already strong legal and enforcement mechanisms.
In subsequent analysis, I investigate the effect of the SEC rule change on the
issuing bond’s cost of debt capital and credit rating. Using an endogenous switching
model to account for the fact that firms choose the market to issue into, I find no effect
in the market for registered Yankee bonds, but a significant and detrimental effect on
the market for Rule 144A issues. The null result within the Yankee bond market is
consistent with existing studies that find no effect amongst publicly registered equity
(Kim et al., 2012). However, the finding of a detrimental affect on the Rule 144A
private market is unique to this paper, and reconciles to theoretical predictions that
a decrease in disclosure costs leads to disclosure unraveling (Grossman and Hart,
1980; Grossman, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983).
The empirical results suggest an unraveling effect of disclosure regulation. Prior
to the SEC rule change, investors could not infer that foreign firms issue into the
Rule 144A market to hide bad news, because some firms avoid SEC registration only
to avoid costly SEC disclosure requirements. Following the SEC rule change, which
decreased the disclosure costs of registration, investors infer a greater likelihood that
firms in the Rule 144A market are hiding bad news, and so offer a lower cost of
debt and higher credit rating. Accordingly, more firms move to avoid this investor
negative reaction by registering with the SEC.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Main Variables of Interest
SEC Registered: Binary variable set equal to one if Mergent FISD identifies the bond
as a foreign issue registered with the SEC, and equal to zero otherwise
Mandatory IFRS: Binary variable equal to one if the bond’s country of origin requires
mandatory IFRS reporting in the same year as the bond issue, and zero otherwise
Cost of Debt: Calculated as the bond yield minus the risk-free rate from a corre-
sponding U.S. Treasury security of similar maturity. The bond yield is calculated
from the bond’s issue price, coupon rate, and term. The risk free rate is obtained
from the Federal Reserve’s H.15 daily report.
Bond Rating: Average bond rating from each of the three bond rating agencies:
Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s. Bond ratings are converted to a numerical
value ranging from zero to 21, following Qi et al. (2010).
Post: A binary variable equal to one if the bond issue date is in calendar year 2008
or later, and equal to zero otherwise.
Bond Characteristic Controls
Face Value: Offering amount of the bond at maturity, scaled by $1,000,000.
Floating Coupon: Binary variable equal to one if the bond’s coupon rate periodically
resets, and equal to zero if the coupon rate is fixed over the bond term.
Putable: Binary variable equal to one if the purchaser of the bond retains a put
option, and equal to zero otherwise
Callable: Binary variable equal to one if the bond can be called by the issuer, and
equal to zero otherwise.
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Duration: The modified duration of the bond, calculated as:
Duration =
1
n
∑K
k tk
c(k)
(1+ y
n
)k·t
P (1 + y
n
)
where A is the par value, c is the coupon rate, n is the number of coupon payments
per year, K is the number of coupon payments remaining, and y is the bond’s yield
to maturity, tk = n+k−1, c(k) = (c/n)A for k = 1, ..., K−1, and c(K) = (1 + cn)A.
Convexity: Bond convexity is calculated as:
Convexity =
1
n
∑K
k=1 tk
c(k)
(1+ y
n
)tk
P (1 + y
n
)2
where tk = k − (1 − n), c(k) = cnA for k = 1, ..., K − 1, and c(K) = (1 + cn)A, and
where P =
∑K
k=1
c(k)
(1+y)tk
Country Level Characteristics
English Legal Origin: Binary variable equal to one if the issuing country’s legal origin
is English, and equal to zero otherwise, obtained from Djankov et al. (2007).
Creditor Rights: Variable ranges from zero to four, increasing in the strength of the
issuing country’s creditor rights, as identified by La Porta et al. (1997) and obtained
from Djankov et al. (2007).
Disclosure Requirements: Obtained from La Porta et al. (2006).
Firm Specific Control Variables
Firm Size: Calculated as the log of total assets, converted to US Dollars, using the
most recent financial statement information before the bond issue, as obtained from
Compustat Global.
MTB: Market-to-Book, calculated using the most recent financial statement infor-
mation before the bond issue, obtained from Compustat Global.
ROA: Return-on-Assets, calculated using the most recent financial statement infor-
mation before the bond issue, obtained from Compustat Global.
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